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Kim Scott’s Benang:
An Ethics of Uncertainty
LISA SLATER, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

The narrator, Harley, of Kim Scott’s novel Benang, suggests that he is writing “the
most local of histories” (10). However, he also questions what it is that he is
writing—“What was it? A family history? A local history? An experiment? A fantasy?” (33). Furthermore, throughout the novel, Harley worries that his “little
history” might be resuscitating racist discourse. The questions that Harley raises
regarding what it is he is writing parallel Scott’s concerns with problems of style,
genre and frame. The colonial ideology of assimilation was disseminated through
writing, which informed non-Indigenous people’s knowledge of and relationships
to Indigenous people and laid the foundation for contemporary race relations.
Given that writing has been a crucial weapon deployed in the interests of colonial
violence, in what style should Harley write? And how can he write of worlds
which he has been estranged from, and educated to disavow? He is trying to recover worlds for which he has no language. For cultural regeneration to occur,
events must be spoken of which, as Scott puts it, are “difficult to say” (216). To
speak of the violence and betrayal that Indigenous people have survived is not
only to relive that violence, but is also to experience deep shame, to which Harley’s
uncle Will gives testimony. To speak out of anger and resistance perhaps offers
Scott a deluge of words in which to berate non-Indigenous Australians for the
horror of colonisation and its continuance, but it equally reopens the wounds of
Indigenous people and potentially limits them to the stifling position of the victim. If those who have survived cultural genocide have relied on silence as a practice of survival, is there, in fact, a language left in which Scott might speak of the
vitality of a Nyoongar worldview? And, if there is, does he risk subjecting it to
recolonisation or debasement by exposing it to non-Indigenous people’s desire to
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assimilate strangeness into the known? Harley’s tentativeness toward and questions regarding what genre he should write in, and what forms of thinking and
living he is cultivating, reflect Scott’s concerns with envisioning an improved future without prescribing an equally reductive or idealised alternative orthodoxy.
However, Harley also alerts readers to the ramifications of not writing and speaking. Harley’s early experiments with writing indicate that it is writing that allows
him to ground himself and, once grounded, he has the ability to regenerate. Scott
is perhaps suggesting that writing offers Harley an anchor in the complexity of
existence and prevents him floating away. Indeed, both his Nyoongar uncles Jack
and Will encourage Harley to return to writing to help ground him and to take
up his responsibility to participate in a cultural regeneration.
It would, therefore, appear that Scott is caught at an ethical impasse—to speak or
not to speak? Scott has created a style in which he both signals to the reader this
aporia and writes his way out. This is why Harley prefers Jack’s form of storytelling. Caution is necessary, as Scott does not want to risk limiting Nyoongar people
in yet another colonising discourse. His style of writing disturbs colonial logic by
exposing its violence. However, if Scott desires to transform contemporary Australia and displace colonial logic, then he not only needs Harley to become someone other than he is, but also to open up a site—a meeting place—in which
Australians can begin to rearticulate the country and themselves, in the hope of
forging a new ethics of engagement, and thereby constituting a “new” country. In
experimenting with a dialogic style of writing, Harley deploys writing as a tool for
transformation in which he does not capture otherness and reduce it to the same,
but rather forges connections.
Much contemporary debate regarding ethics argues that ethics begins when one’s
certainty is disabled. Ethics is an encounter with the other whereby their radical
alterity cannot be reduced to one’s knowing. Simon Critchley suggests that the
ethical moment is that of being “pre-reflectively addressed by the other person in
a way that calls me into question and obliges me to be responsible. This is a
concrete context for ethics; or rather, it is the context in which ethics interrupts
the context of the world” (48). One’s certainty is blocked and one is exposed to
the singularity of the other. The other escapes one’s comprehension. Thus, an
encounter with alterity is a performative moment that cannot be regulated, foreseen or dominated in advance (Critchely 114). As Kevin Hart suggests, ethics is a
“movement from the solitude of my being to a sociality that is irreducible to
being or knowing” (56). The exposure to the other reveals the radical social construction of our self; indeed, that we are reliant on the other for our self. Hence,
the ethical moment ruptures the self from self-understanding and causes anguish.
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The world is beyond our comprehension, yet we are reliant upon it and those
who dwell in it for our subjectivity. Ethics is reliant on self-exposure—an openness to the other. Despite the pain of the impossibility of knowing, as Andrew
Gibson suggests, “it is also the seed of the most extraordinary and unexpected
regenerations and renewals” (79). In the performative utterance of addressing
one’s unknowable interlocutor, a gap is opened in one’s identity, in which the self
is reconfigured.
To resist, challenge and reconfigure the colonial project that continues in Australia, where the colonisers’ culture, will and knowledge dominate the social field
and notions of “truth,” Indigenous people must name themselves with names
that are generated from histories, memories and imaginaries that are other to
non-Indigenous Australians. Non-Indigenous Australians, and I speak here predominately of white, settler Australians, are confronted by cultural difference
that cannot and will not conform to non-Indigenous memories or history. Hence,
to respond ethically in cross-cultural engagements one must be open to otherness
and not synthesise it into sameness. In so doing, one is exposing oneself to the
destablising process of not being able to recognise oneself in the other. One’s
openness to the other leaves one exposed to another’s desires, and thus subject to
being reconfigured and becoming someone other than one is.
One’s self is composed from encounters with otherness. To perceive of the self as
emerging from encounters with otherness is to radically transform concepts of
subjectivity and identity. The image of subjectivity is not one of self-consistency
or fixity, but rather of is fluidity and porosity. The other and otherness is not a
threat to one’s being, but the site from which one’s identity is generated. In
Australia both Indigenous and non-Indigenous identities are constituted from
cross-cultural encounters. However, political and social action are only possible
through self-limitation. To take up a speaking position one must participate in
the necessary fiction of an arbitrary closure that makes politics and identity possible (Hall 137). One cannot speak out against colonialism and racism without
entering into a historical and cultural dialogue that in turn positions and limits
one as a particular subject.
Scott has composed an uncertain narrator to portray the intersubjectivity and
intertextuality of the self and to limit imaginative desire. Scott begins Benang
with the protagonist Harley conceived as the “first white man born” (10). He is
the end result of his grandfather, Ern’s, personal eugenicist project, which participates in the wider official assimilation project of biologically and culturally absorbing Indigenous people into white Australia. Harley attempts to reverse Ern’s
process by reconnecting with his Nyoongar relatives and Nyoongar cultural knowl-
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edge. In constructing Harley as a subject in formation, Scott bears witness to
Indigenous (and non-Indigenous) identity being created through dialogue,
storying and embodied practices. Harley’s identity is produced in the articulation of cultural differences. Scott does not seek to prescribe what it is to be
Nyoongar, or Indigenous, but rather positions Indigeneity, like all identities, as
culturally constructed and always in the process of becoming.
Harley does not know who he is. In a sense he must start again, not from the “clean
slate” that Ern envisions, but from learning to listen carefully, feel and to open
himself up to alternative ways of knowing and being. The vulnerable, unconsoled
speaking position allows for a questioning: Who am I now? How can I speak this?
Speaking from the position of vulnerable identity allows Scott to investigate the
complexity of postcolonial Australia. It is too late for us to forget one another so we
must examine the interconnectedness that history has thrust upon us. Scott explores this interconnected history through his unconsoled narrator, who cannot
speak with too much authority. However, Harley’s indeterminacy highlights the vast
array of possibilities available to him. Scott thus exposes his readers to the opportunities that exist for Australia to move beyond contemporary race relations and cast
off the thinking which contracts us to a history that prevents us from becoming
other than what we are. In writing from a liminal space Scott empowers Benang’s
Nyoongar community to articulate alternative understandings of belonging and
identity, which will act to destabilise white dominance.
Despite Harley’s indeterminate identity being initially self-alienating, his position as an “unhealthy” postcolonial subject is a weapon that can be deployed
against colonial history and mythology, by unsettling the logic of white, western
supremacy that continues to dominate our present. As Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs
argue:
The nation [Australia] becomes unfamiliar to itself precisely because
of the postcolonial condition in which an Indigenous population is
increasingly able not just to “write back” but to produce a range of
special effects, which can be unsettling right across the board. (135)
Harley’s special effect is not only his “propensity for elevation,” which satirises
and laments the colonial regime’s project to raise the native up, but also importantly the unhealthy subject that this has produced. Harley’s unhealth is a special
effect that is unsettling to the rational colonial project as it exposes its lack of
power to maintain order and limit life to that which abides by its logic. Its insistence on uniformity institutes unimaginable effects. Harley’s strangeness inaugurates uncertainty and hence potential anxiety in his readers who imagine their
country and fellow Australians into coherence. Scott therefore reflects a strange
and estranging image back at the nation.
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In focusing on the moments and processes that are produced in the articulation of
cultural difference, Scott initiates an empowering political process for Indigenous
peoples (Bhabha 3). This process enables an investigation into the micro- and
macro-political initiatives which instituted contemporary Indigenous realities,
without prescribing and limiting Indigeneity. Initiating this process, Scott envisages Indigenous communities—local, national and global—that are anchored in
history and the land and in a process of coming into being. Harley’s indeterminacy becomes a site of empowerment. Declaring his identity to be provisional
enables him to contest colonialism’s essentialised racial identity constructs. Furthermore, self-invention demands that one be recognised on one’s own terms and
as a desiring subject. As Franz Fanon declares:
As soon as I desire I am asking to be considered . . . I demand notice
to be taken of my negating activity insofar as I pursue something
other than life; insofar as I do battle for the creation of a human
world—that is a world of reciprocal recognitions. (218)
In taking up a position in which one is “doing battle for the creation of the
human world,” one is recognising that one is not only a colonised subject. In the
act of endlessly creating oneself, one is not a slave to history.
By conceiving of an uncertain narrator, Scott suggests that one can author their
world, but that their text is always incomplete and entangled in a plurality of
relations. One can be an author, but never an authority, as oneself and the world
are ineluctably other. Ern and his eugenicist colleagues’ style of speech and writing are inadequate to represent Harley’s subjectivity and to form ideologies. The
eugenicists’ static and prescriptive language reinforces the political authority of
the unified and coherent Western subject. Mimicking the eugenicists’ style of
writing disables Harley from speaking of himself and his world. Harley searches
for a narrative mode that takes its shape from the living heteroglossia of the self
and the world. Benang is both the quest and an answer.

M AKING N ONSENSE

OF

COLONIAL L OGIC

To reverse Ern’s project, Harley enters into the labyrinth of Ern’s and his contemporaries’ writings, files, photos and records, and in so doing is exposed to the
complexity and multiplicity of people’s lives. He is overwhelmed by written
records, a deluge of oral histories, fragments of stories, half forgotten memories,
pain that has never been spoken and cannot find a language by which to be
released, hybrid tales, stories long buried under colonial representation and stories lying quiet, waiting to be reactivated and to re-enter the world. Harley be-
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comes aware of how people’s personal destinies are interwoven and determined by
historical contexts (Lukacs 42). He must find a style, and an ethics, of speech
which allows him to connect up the many remnants that he has discovered, to
write a counter narrative that enables a multiplicity of perspectives and regenerates Nyoongar cultural knowledge.
Having discovered Ern’s study, Harley reads and rereads Ern’s and contemporary
eugenicists’ writing. Harley familiarises himself with the eugenicists’ conviction
that whites had the moral right to be the creators of a new people from a despised
race. Upon hearing hints of Ern’s project, Harley moves from initial shock and
disbelief to a firm conviction that his grandfather had intended to be his creator,
and that he was the end result of Ern’s fantasy: a fiction. Despite these discoveries
and his desire to reverse his grandfather’s process—and whatever understanding
he might have come to of this process—and although he has rejected Ern’s truth,
still he remains with only his grandfather’s knowledge of him: “My grandfather
had reassured me, told me he knew, told me my place. I knew already the bullshit
of that” (146). He deploys his floating, a consequence of Ern’s project, to offer
him new perspectives. Floating high above the land, moored to the earth by
fishing line, Harley watches the sea blossom, “[a]ll day, blooming and dying,
blooming and dying” (146). The land and the sea merge and separate. It is only
his perspective that distinguishes them as different entities. He is not in control
of his floating and he is torn from his new perspective of the world by gusts of
wind and flung against buildings. The floating allows him new vision, but his
lack of control over it prevents him from being able to “concentrate on any sort of
story, no narrative” (147). Just as the sounds that issue from his body are beyond
his control, so is his ability to utilise his differences for revolutionary purposes:
The cuff of my trousers caught on the guttering, and there I was;
uplifted and spread out to the wind, which whistled through me,
and in and out of orifices, singing some spiteful tune.
I could not concentrate on any sort of story, no narrative. My
trousers ripped a little more.
Desperately I tried to get some words flowing through my head.
Fuck fuck fuck fuck fuck I gotta I gotta gotta I must must must I
will will will oh will will Uncle Will what he had said and my father
and what I guessed, remembered, imagined? . . .
I was worried that someone might see. An embarrassment, such
an abuse of reason. I was a freak. (146–47)
Harley’s freakish behaviour, his abuse of reason, frightens and disturbs Ern. However, Harley remains lonely and isolated and still unable to participate in creatively remaking the world. The knowledge of his grandfather’s project establishes
a context which allows him to critique his subjectivity and his history, but it does
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not offer him a language in which he can generate a counter-narrative that challenges assimilationist knowledge.
Early in the novel Harley addresses the readers, thanking them for “remain[ing]
with this shifty, snaking narrative. I am grateful; more grateful than you know,
believe me” (22). He indicates that the stories he has to tell cannot be told within
established writing styles. Scott exposes the historical circumstances and events,
and configurations of power that have led to contemporary conditions of existence. In composing a “shifting, snaking narrative,” Scott suggests that it is impossible to write in a unified and coherent style and still generate a narrative that is
inclusive of the plurality of perspectives of the historical players. A closed and
certain composition endeavours to deny the multiplicity of voices, the plurality of
relations, and the open-ended present (Bakhtin 7). That is, Scott’s text exposes
the vulnerabilities, uncertainties and fluidity of subjectivity. He suggests that a
new ethics of cross-cultural engagement—Australia becoming postcolonial—is
reliant on transformations of subjectivity. Transformations of subjectivity are reliant upon infusing narratives of the self with alternative stories and knowledge.
Scott’s style of storytelling rehearse the process of the self being open to and
reconstituted by otherness. They conceive of subjectivity, like language and storytelling, as a shared event (Holquist 28). One self is always an improvisation generated within a dialogue.

L OQUACIOUS BECOMINGS

Chatalong’s childish verbosity teaches Harley a style of storytelling that is in
“living contact with unfinished, still evolving contemporary reality (the openended
present)” (Bakhtin 7). Jack, or Chatalong as he is known as a child, anchors himself in a vastly complex, threatening and potentially estranging world by composing stories and sound scapes from the intense fabric of his world. At school
Chatalong is gagged to stop his incessant talking, and his sister, Kathleen, reads
“his eyes and small movements, fearing that otherwise she would lose touch with
him completely” (259). By connecting with this talkative child—listening to
stories of his childhood—Harley witnesses language being deployed differently
from the way Ern and his contemporaries deploy it, and recognises the demand it
makes on him to hear differently, and the opportunities it holds for self transformation. Scott writes:
Chatalong talked and talked. He liked to hear sounds emerging from
himself. He farted, hummed, sang, and—when he talked—obviously shaped his words at the very last moment. It gave him an
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engaging charm; it made him honest, even though so much of what
he said was full of contradictions. Most of it, they were sure, was
true. They were equally sure he never intended to lie. It was just that
he spoke as quickly as he thought and, having picked up so many
strange bits and pieces of stories in his short life, understood that the
only way they could be connected was by his utterances. (250)
In his pursuit of a path that might lead him out of the limited identity which Ern
bequeathed to him, Harley takes Jack’s talkative younger self and Kathleen, Jack’s
interlocutor, as his guides.
In recalling stories of his youth, the older Jack alerts Harley to the disparity between Jack as a child and as a young man. Harley ponders:
Chatalong had been struck dumb. What happened to that easy way
with words, the easy launching of them, the unthinking way he
could set them into flight? (99)
After the death of Daniel Coolman, Harriette’s white husband, Jack’s family are
no longer exempt from the Aboriginal Act and are removed from their traditional
country to Mogumber Settlement. At the mission the lighter skinned children
are removed, but because Jack is too dark to be sent elsewhere, he is instructed to
care for an old blind couple. At the Settlement Jack is segregated from his country
and the two people who listen to and understand him, Fanny and Kathleen.
However, his mother Dinah, from whom he has been separated since he was a
small child, works in the kitchen of the Settlement, and “Jack learnt many things
in the kitchen, and there was an awakening, just as there have been many
awakenings” (94). Although Scott does not inform the reader of what these
awakenings entailed, we know that prior to being removed to the Settlement Jack
was an innocent, naïve boy, despite much of what he had witnessed. At the Settlement Jack learns the harsh realities of Nyoongar people’s lives and of the government’s intention to destroy Nyoongar people and culture. While with Fanny and
Kathleen, Jack was connected to a living, breathing Nyoongar world, which informed a deep sense of himself, his belonging and identity, and his loquaciousness enabled him to devise connections in an otherwise confusing environment.
However, at the Settlement he is silenced by the realisation of the destruction
that surrounds him. The old people he cares for speak to him in a language he
does not understand but which
reached deep within him, made him feel like an instrument being
played. But such a poor instrument because, although he felt the
humming alive within him, it was more like a struggle to breathe
than articulated song.
Inside his head he tried the sounds, attempted the rhythm, felt
the vowels slipping together. (99)
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Although he stays in touch with the rhythms, Jack is estranged from a means of
expression. Jack becomes isolated, which makes him vulnerable to colonial, racist
discourse. His chatter had enabled him to form connections with the world and
his family and gave him a narrative authority. This in turn offered Jack a sense of
belonging, identity and agency.
Jack’s silence invokes a dangerous alienation and loss of identity. When a corroboree
takes place at the Settlement, Jack refuses to participate. After a long silence Jack
screams, “No, no, not me” (99). The performance of Nyoongar spirituality has
become strange to him. Scott juxtaposes the corroboree scene with a violent racial
incident in which a young Nyoongar boy is tarred and feathered as a perverse
form of being disciplined into white “civilised” behaviour. The narrative jump
from the corroboree scene to the scene of racial violence indicates the connections
made by Jack. Scott draws the readers’ attention to the effects of internalising
racist discourse. Scott ushers the readers toward connecting Jack’s silence—his
inability to articulate the hum (his inner Nyoongar world, which offers him a
sense of identity and belonging)—with the dangers of internalising a despised
image of his Indigenous self. The corroboree no longer represents a spiritual connection to the country but rather a punishable offence. Scott is suggesting that
Jack’s alienation and estrangement from Nyoongar worldviews opens up a space
in which his identity is informed by Western racial constructions. Thereby, he is
filled with shame and his life force is stifled.
The readers do not witness Jack’s growth from this alienated young man to an
older, wiser, more vital man. We are not informed of how this process occurs.
However, Harley’s “shifting, snaking narrative” (22) demands the readers make
the connection. The readers must write in their own connections as they are positioned, like many of the Nyoongar characters, and most especially Harley, in a
confusing, violent world in which, unless they develop an interpretative autonomy,
they will be created in someone else’s vision. Jack is almost defeated at the Settlement. He becomes an angry, isolated, silent man, cut off from the vital life force of
his childhood. Jack’s survival and vitality rely not only upon being able to negotiate colonial power relationships, but also upon maintaining a connection with
that which is nonsense to the colonial, assimilationist discourse. Despite Jack’s
inability to comprehend the old, blind couple’s language, it keeps him “humming”—an alternative reality alive within him. In attempting its rhythms, slipping the vowels together, and forming sounds that say nothing, Jack rescues himself from being destroyed by the assimilationist practices. The old people’s language keeps Jack connected to Indigenous culture. Like Jack’s childish verbosity,
and his later “deluge of words,” Harley’s “clumsy narrative” (165) is a style of
narrative which demonstrates a plurality of relations, and in the process of authoring

156

JASAL

4

2005

his world enables him to “selectively assimilat[e] the words of others” (Bakhtin
341). Their respective narrative styles formulate and articulate their own ideologies, which are opposed to eugenicist and assimilationist discourse.

THE M ONSTROSITY

OF THE

NOVEL :

LIBERATING QUIET VOICES AND GENERATING ANTI - COLONIALISM

The experiences of his Nyoongar relatives charge Harley with an ethical imperative to expose his self to uncertainty—to allow uncertainty to regulate his thinking and his writing, hence his self-transformation. Harley sets himself the project
of beginning to “pick up a rhythm begun deeper and long before those named
Fanny and Sandy One Mason” (32). He wants to transgress the lines of the eugenicist writing. Ern’s intention was to be Harley’s creator (32), and to reverse
this project Harley must become both his own creator and subject to other/s creation stories. To do so, Harley immerses himself in a deluge of Nyoongar stories.
Lost in the labyrinth of narratives—narratives that are in excess of colonial logic—
he becomes unfamiliar to both himself and Ern. Scott’s dialogic narrative style
suggests that to become postcolonial one most expose oneself to the destabilising
process of being open to alterity.
Jack’s cautious, wary and dialogic style indicates a way of writing that might
liberate alternative voices and not subsume them under the authoritative voice of
the author. To write against colonial discourse Scott must be wary that the characters are not subordinated to his viewpoint or merge with his consciousness;
thus, however different they might be from Ern’s representations of Nyoongar
people, they would nonetheless be reduced to a single consciousness. The truth of
Chatalong’s tales emerges not from the imposed authority of the speaker, but
rather from the unfolding of a multiplicity of perspectives and a struggle of the
plurality of languages which compose his stories. What might appear to be childish verbosity or nonsense is the key to Harley creating a writing self who practises
a contemporary ethics of speech. It is in the listening to, and the writing of, that
which is nonsense to eugenicist discourse that Harley is enlightened to the potential to transform his whingeing into a revolutionary writing. Harley deploys that
which is nonsense to Western reason to defamiliarize and disrupt its cultural hegemony. In so doing, he carves out a place for alternative practices of reading and
storying, hence new sites of articulation.
Benang is alive with struggles. Scott avows the heteroglossia of languages and the
social world. He rejects the racist ideology that dominates representations of and
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cross-cultural engagement with Indigenous people. Benang is both a political
critique and a reimagining of contemporary Australia. Scott intervenes in and
reconfigures dominant race relations. To do so requires, as Ato Quayson maintains, double vision—a recognising of existing social formations and a decomposing and reaching beyond to alternative visions (95). Scott does this by aligning
Harley with ever-present Nyoongar worldviews. When Harley asserts, “Sandy
One is no white man. Just as I am no white man, despite the look of me . . .”
(494), he identifies with being Nyoongar and locates his struggle to “find the
right words” as a continuation of Fanny’s struggle:
Fanny embellished, linked, led him on. Later in the night, Fanny
and the fire spoke to all the sleeping, slumped bodies. She mumbled, and sang softly to herself, often with words that they might
not know. Sometimes of children she had lost, the father mother
that were taken. Her brothers, sisters.
Wondering, always, how to say it softly enough so that they
might remember. (245–46)
Harley is deterritorialised from an assimilationist assemblage and is reterritorialised
onto a Nyoongar world. He is no longer the “first white man born.” The authoritative language holds no power over him and cannot prescribe his Being in the
world. Harley’s style of storytelling speaks of and enables his new values to take
shape and form, which gives them a political potency. At both the opening and the
close of the novel, this “spiteful tune” has been transformed into a “hum with the
resonance of place” (494). Even though some of his own people are made uncomfortable and cynical by his presence, once he begins to sing, “no cynicism remains”
(7), as Harley becomes the instrument through which the very potentiality of life
sounds. The language that his grandfather deployed to activate the eugenicist
world of social Darwinism, which privileges white masculinity, is dispersed and
replaced by a writing that gestures toward the vitality and intensity of life.
Scott suggests that language does not reflect but creates the world. The eugenicists created a world in which one engaged with difference through repression,
ordered violence and fear. Australia’s race relations were created from the words
chosen and silences held. Harley becomes the reader’s tentative guide to creating
a new ethics of engagement. He hovers around the campfire where the readers
have gathered to watch him perform—to hear him sing. He does not present the
reader with the authentic voice of Indigeneity; instead an ambiguous, barely human form rises from the ground, insisting on his otherness, yet demanding dialogue. Scott refuses to appease his readers by offering them a healthy subject, a
protagonist who has worked through his pain. Rather, he charges us all with the
reciprocal responsibility of recognising the material effects of thinking and writing. He refuses the enforced Western vision of Aboriginality and forms uncertain
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representations that arise out of Nyoongar traditions, the experience of racial violence and plurality of individual and social life. Benang is a novel that commands
the reader to understand all utterances are composed, like Harley, from a multiplicity of languages. Yet Harley (like Scott) stories his world to participate in a
social dialogue. He chooses his heroes, mentors and guides from outside normalised Australian culture, and his choices indicate the community for whom, and
with whom, he speaks. Benang is a meeting place—a site in which a dialogue
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians might begin, and which
recognises that on the ground beneath our feet “there are many stories” (495).
Scott bids his interlocutors to listen to these stories and begin to create new ways
of narrating Australia, thus infusing the country with Indigenous cultural perspectives.
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